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Abstract  
New approaches in health care, such as e.g. Integrated Delivery Systems, affect the role and tasks of medical 
suppliers. More and more, medical suppliers are incorporated into the process of guiding patients to medical 
specialists and hospitals and thus managing the course of disease. In this context, the role of medical gate-
keepers and case managers may provide opportunities for undesirable behavior (from the network's point of 
view). Therefore, compensation-induced incentives for gatekeepers and case managers are in the main focus of 
the paper. Different health care payment systems and the impact of financial and non-financial incentives on case 
managers and gate-keepers in medical networks are analyzed. Another focus is laid on medical suppliers that are 
not involved in managing diseases and guiding patients. Due to their smaller margin of actions and possibilities 
to take advantage of it, reimbursement should emphasize different aspects than for case managers. 
  
JEL Classification: I11, J33, L22 
 
1 Introduction 
The modern industrial society requires changes in the health care systems. Ageing societies 
due to demographic changes challenge the established health care institutions since the 
medically cost-intensive stage of life is expanded. Additionally, more sophisticated yet more 
expensive medical therapies are available due to pronounced medical research. In many cases, 
these new therapies are not curative but only substantive and life-prolonging. Furthermore, 
changed disease patterns oblige therapies that require a coordination of different medical 
suppliers. 
Integrated Delivery Systems (IDS) and medical networks in health care address these issues 
and should guarantee a holistic, sound and economically efficient medical supply by 
implementing novel organisational and managerial approaches. Physicians, hospitals and 
other medical suppliers organize in networks and, thus, synergies due to information 
exchange and interdisciplinary can be exploited. The process of medical treatment should be 
coordinated and medical care requiring more than one medical supplier should be guided. It 
has often been argued that the management and coordination of patients in the health care 
sector should be done by gate-keepers, case managers and disease management programs. 
Those methods of guiding patients through the medical care process and integrating health 
care have been in the focus of many papers on health care delivery systems. Schneider et al. 
(2004) examine the primary care case management und argue that quality of primary care 
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case management is much less reviewed than the quality of other health plans. Burns/Pauly 
(2002) analyze typical mistakes made so far in integrating health care and make suggestions 
on how to improve the process of integration. Among other things, they point out that the 
coexistence of disease and case management can generate a more efficient health care. 
However, an incentive compatible compensation scheme is important in every health care 
delivery system in order to obtain a quality and cost effective medical care. E.g., Hellinger 
(1996) compares several empirical studies on health plans and points out that financial 
incentives are the key to reduce utilization of medical services in health care networks. 
In the medical sector many different reimbursement schemes have developed over time. One 
could divide those different schemes in prospective and cost based compensation schemes.  
Both methods implicate objectionable incentives, e.g. the fee for service compensation which 
is traditional in the German health care sector induces medical suppliers to provide more 
treatments than necessary. In the health economics literature different reimbursement schemes 
for medical suppliers have been widely discussed. Newhouse (1996) identifies a trade-off 
between efficiency and selection, i.e. the more a compensation scheme evokes efficient 
treatment the more the suppliers are induced to pursue risk selection. Ellis (1998) classifies 
three unwanted incentives of reimbursement schemes namely risk-type conditioned amount of 
service which he refers to as creaming, undersupply (skimping) and dumping of patients. He 
finds that prospectively compensated providers will pursue creaming, dumping and skimping 
while cost-based reimbursement results in an overprovision of services to all patients. Ma 
(1994) discusses cost and quality incentives of different reimbursement schemes and obtains 
optimal reimbursement for the case with and without discrimination of patients possible. 
Iversen/Luras (2000) find empirical evidence that capitated general practitioners refer patients 
more often to a specialist. Ma/McGuire (2002) model the impact of network incentives. Yet, 
they model these incentives independent of the initial provider reimbursement. Shortell et al. 
(1994) examine organizational structures of Integrated Delivery Systems. They regard the 
varying and often contradictory financial incentives as a main barrier to implementation of 
IDS. They emphasize the necessity of an authority that organizes the guidance of patients.  
In the present paper, a medical network is examined where some gate-keepers and case 
managers can guide patients by deciding on whether or not to refer them. In particular, the 
impact of different reimbursement schemes on medical suppliers who can abuse their 
authorization to refer patients is examined. A special focus is laid on how the compensation 
influences the coordination of medical services and thus the optimal health care process. 
2 
Different possibilities of mitigating unwanted incentives from the compensation are 
discussed.  
Fee for service, fixed income (salary), fee per admission and DRG lump compensation and 
capitation are the considered compensation methods. A performance related compensation 
proportion of reimbursement is also in the focus since incentivization can be done quite 
exactly by such a component. These reimbursement schemes are the most prevalent ways of 
compensating medical suppliers. 
This paper contributes to the existing literature because it provides a systematic analysis of 
possible compensation schemes in medical networks with gate-keeping and case management. 
Moreover, the expanded margin of gate-keepers and case managers in medical networks is 
analyzed. These medical suppliers can use this margin to refer patients they do not want to 
treat for financial reasons – depending on the adopted compensation of the gatekeepers and 
case managers. In the focus of the examination is a medical supplier who treats patients but 
also decides on the treatment of his patients from other medical suppliers by referring them. 
In the lack of a better term this medical supplier is referred to as a case manager. Yet, unlike 
in cases where e.g. nurses are case managers, this medical supplier can decide on treatments 
independently. In addition, he has bargaining power when negotiating with other medical 
suppliers because the case manager decides on the care process. The case manager is a gate-
keeper at the same time because it is assumed that patients must consult their case manager 
first except of in cases of emergencies. In particular, the discussion in the German-speaking 
community on how to improve medical care in terms of quality and cost reduction emphasizes 
the necessity of a medical supplier guiding patients stringently and explicitly through the 
medical care process. For example, Erlinghagen/ Pihl (2005) analyze the impact of having a 
family doctor who can naturally take the position of a case manager and gate-keeper on the 
amount of visits to other medical suppliers. The recent health care reform in Germany forces 
public health care insurers to offer tariffs with gate-keeping. In Switzerland, gate-keepers in 
medical care have long been in use. 
Additionally, the position of those medical suppliers that are not involved in coordinating and 
guiding patients and treatments is examined. Because those medical cannot refer patients but 
only receive referred patients certain unwanted incentives might occur. Thus, due to their 
smaller margin of actions and possibilities of taking advantage of it, compensation should 
emphasize different aspects than for case managers. 
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It is assumed that medical suppliers maximize their utility which includes maximizing 
financial outcome and leisure time. Often, such as in McGuire (2000), it is assumed that 
medical suppliers also gain some utility from helping their patients. This is not explicitly 
considered in this paper but might reduce some financial incentives that decrease the quality 
of care. Yet, it cannot be assumed that those ethical motives are so strong, that medical 
providers will always act in an altruistic way. Due to a slightly different position of a case 
manager the objectionable incentives of reimbursement are defined somewhat different than 
by Ellis (1998). Case managers can be induced not to attend to their patients properly either 
by over- or undersupplying. Secondly, they can pursue indirect risk selection by providing 
dissatisfying care to their patients in order to provoke them to choose a different case manager 
and finally, in order to avoid costs they can let other medical suppliers complete the 
treatments they should have done. Medical suppliers that are not case managers cannot refer 
patients to other suppliers if they do not want to treat them. Yet, they can supply an 
inadequate amount of care. If they can influence the decisions of the case manager they can 
also try to pursue risk selection. These points are discussed in section 3 in detail. 
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows: In the following section, medical 
suppliers are investigated who work as case managers and gatekeepers. At first, it is assumed 
that patients are assigned to one provider and cannot easily choose another one. Incentives 
due to compensation are analyzed and strategies to diminish false incentives are discussed. 
Later on, the assumption that patients are assigned to one case manager is lifted and 
consequences of a free choice of a case manager are illustrated. In the third section, medical 
suppliers that are not involved in managing diseases and guiding patients are in the focus. 
Three cases will be distinguished. Either those medical suppliers are completely not involved 
in determining the treatments they have to carry out or they can decide autonomously on 
therapies of referred patients or they can even influence the case manager. The paper finishes 
with some concluding remarks.   
2 Case managers  
2.1 Assignment of patients to one case manager 
Position and compensation of the case manager 
In the following part of this section, the focus is laid on medical suppliers who are responsible 
for the guidance of patients in a medical network but at the same time still offer health care 
treatments by themselves. Therefrom, the case manager has the referral monopoly. It is 
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assumed that patients are assigned to a case manager and cannot easily resort to another case 
manager if they are not content with the medical performance of the initial case manager or 
the medical suppliers the case manager referred them to. Altogether, the only possibility for 
the assigned patients to gain access to health care is via the case manager.  
Possibilities for reimbursement schemes for the case manager will be analyzed and resulting 
incentives will be discussed. The assumption of a fixed assignment of patients will be lifted 
later on and the impact of free choice of case managers will examined.  
The case manager can affect the number of medical cases by persuading patients to consult 
him more often1 and by referring or not referring patients. He also has some impact on the 
types of illnesses also by referring and by the treatment he selects. Thus, it would make sense 
to choose a compensation scheme where the case manager takes part in those risks as well. If 
the case manager is reimbursed by capitation he bears the whole health insurance risk. In that 
case, the case manager can gain most by undersupplying his patients. Yet, it has to be pointed 
out that the case manager can indirectly select risks by referring patients and thus transferring 
costs to other medical suppliers. This will only take place if the reimbursement of the case 
manager is independent of the compensation of the other medical suppliers.   
To avoid this passing on of patients, a compensation-scheme can be implemented such that 
the treatments carried out by other medical suppliers directly reduce the capitation payment2 
of the case manager. In that case, the case manager does not only control the process of the 
therapy but is also responsible for the whole reimbursement alongside the medical attendance. 
From an insurance point of view, the case manager bears the whole health insurance risk for 
all medical so there might be some risk bearing costs. On the one hand, a case manager might 
have a smaller risk group than an insurance company since the size of the risk group is limited 
by his maximum workload of the case manager. Thus, the group balance concept might apply 
better to an insurance company than to one medical supplier. On the other hand, the case 
manager might be more risk averse than an insurance company. If the case manager 
determines all elements of a treatment for all involved medical suppliers and bears the entire 
insurance risk, he has a very prominent impact on how much medical care is allocated to a 
patient. Therefore, he can draw ample profit by undersupplying his patients if he is 
reimbursed by capitation. This profit can be gained on the one hand by neglecting treatments 
that he is responsible for. On the other hand, the case manager could also refrain from 
                                                 
1 For a detailed discussion of physician-induced demand please refer to e.g. Evans (1974) and Phelps (1986). 
2 The capitation must, of course, be higher than in the case where the case manager must only pay for his own 
expenses. 
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referring patients to other medical suppliers. This might be particularly relevant in the case of 
expensive treatment from other suppliers such as surgery or other therapies that require 
hospitalization. In this respect, it might be problematic if the case manager must compensate 
for all other involved medical suppliers. Yet, it is necessary to point out that a global budget 
of a case manager can also have some positive network effects. For example, in the case of no 
global budget, a case manager could refrain from some medical services if he must only pay 
the cost while only other medical suppliers benefit from those services.3  
If the case manager is reimbursed by capitation but does not have to compensate for the health 
care services of other medical suppliers, the case manager has a significant incentive to 
simply transfer patients rather then treat them. Hence, it should be examined if a capitation 
could be combined with other incentives to ensure a decline in of passed on patients.  
A negative financial incentive for a capitated case manager in the case of referral could reduce 
the inducement of the case manager to refer patients unjustifiedly. Ideally, these “referral 
costs“ should make the case manager indifferent between referring the patient and treating 
him on his own from a financial point of view. Attention should be paid to the fact that a case 
manager might have a higher incentive to undersupply his patients if he cannot refer them free 
of charge anymore. Therefore, a quality incentive should be provided e.g. a performance 
related component of the compensation that is adjusted to quality of care aspects.    
In the case of a diagnosis-related fee for admission compensation, the case manager bears 
only some part of the financial risk – namely which treatments are applied. In the case of not 
perfectly correlated disease clustering a case manager also bears some risk regarding what 
kind of illnesses of the patients he treats if some diseases are more profitable. Yet, the medical 
supplier is not provided with a negative financial incentive if he treats more patients than he 
should. Hence, he can profit from increasing treatment cases and cases with a high lump sum 
compensation in relation to the required workload. The case manager will try to influence 
patients to consult him more often if he still has unused capacities. In case of a relatively high 
compensation the case manager might refrain from referring patients even in cases where he 
should refer them. In the case of a relatively low lump sum compensation, a case manager is 
induced to refer patients unwarrantedly rather than to treat the patient on his own. 
Recapitulatory, there are two undesirable incentive effects, either that the case manager does 
                                                 
3 Such externalities can occur if the for example the case manager is a general practitioner and should carry out 
prophylaxis for some diseases where the case manager is not involved in the treatment in case of an outbreak of 
the disease.  
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not refer in cases of a relatively high lump sum or that the case manager refers patients with a 
rather low lump compensation too quickly. 
If the fee for service compensation is diagnosis-related the case manager is induced to 
upgrade i.e. to classify his patients into higher compensated disease groups. One could argue 
that a budget could diminish the incentive to upgrade, but in reality a budget rather induces an 
increase of risk-selective referrals by the case manager. In the case of a budget, the case 
manager will survey intensely which cases are the most profitable for his restricted budget. 
Additionally, in the event of the threat of a budget excess, the case manager will be induced to 
simply refer all incoming patients. To avoid this, the budget could be designed in such a way 
that not only the treated but also the referred cases are incorporated in the budget of the case 
manager. Of course, this only makes sense when the case manager also decides on the 
classification of the referred patients or is at least significantly involved. In that case the case 
manager can gain profits by upgrading the cases treated by him, while simultaneously 
downgrading the referred cases. If the compensation of the other medical suppliers is 
determined by the diagnosis-related group to which the case manager assigned the medical 
case to, a systematic incentive of undersupplying arises for treatments not done by the case 
manager. Altogether, the imposition of a budget does not reduce incentives for upgrading and 
risk-selectively referring patients and thus cannot solve these problems.  
If a medical supplier is reimbursed by a fee for service compensation scheme, he will be 
induced to extend the amount of treatments and thus will not be induced to work efficiently. 
Therefore, a case manager will try to treat patients on his own and hence delay referrals or 
even refrain from them. However, financial incentives could be designed such that that case 
managers sooner refer patients. This can be done by a referral award by which the case 
manager is ideally always indifferent from a financial point of view between referring a 
patient and treating him.4  
If the case manager is reimbursed by a fixed income the case manager is not induced to treat 
his patients economically. Yet, he does not have any incentives to refer patients too easily or 
only reluctantly. An incentive to a more economic treatment of patients can be created by 
introducing a performance-related compensation element.  
In case of a fee for service compensation, the reimbursement does not only provide no 
incentives for allocating resources efficiently but also induce the case manager to waste 
                                                 
4 This referral award is the complete contrast to the referral costs in cases of a capitated case manager. Yet, it 
will be difficult to design an award that will make the case manager indifferent between referring and treating in 
all possible cases.  
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resources and to carry out more treatments than necessary. Thus, compensation through a 
salary is preferable from a resource allocation point of view. Yet, the motivation of a medical 
supplier could be higher in the case where he is reimbursed depending on his work-load. It is 
necessary to point out that via a performance-based compensation element the case manager 
is induced to undersupply and to refer patients more often than necessary. Thus, a quality-
based performance related compensation component could reduce these undesirable 
incentives.   
Implications for the medical care process 
The analysis of different reimbursement schemes for case managers showed that from a 
resource allocation point of view a fixed income is preferable to a fee for service 
compensation. If the case manager is reimbursed by capitation, additional financial incentives 
should be created in order to prevent the case manager from undersupplying and intensive 
referring practice. While implementing a medical network with case management and gate-
keeping, it is very important to adjust the chosen reimbursement scheme to the aims of the 
network. Apparently, there is a trade-off between cost and quality incentives. Therefore, the 
operators of a medical care network must decide whether they rather want to aim for a cost or 
for a quality effective network or a mixture. Yet, in practical implementation of medical 
network one should not act from the assumption that a carefully chosen compensation system 
averts divergent behavior of case managers at all times. Nevertheless, it would still be 
advisable to try to eliminate as much objectionable financial incentives as possible while 
designing the reimbursement in a medical network.  
2.2 Pressure of competition among different case managers 
Position and compensation of the case manager 
If patients are free to choose a case manager, the competition among different case managers 
could increase the pressure to perform well. The case manager will endeavour to avoid that 
patients for which they receive a high compensation choose another case manager and thus 
attend these patients to their comfort. Yet, it remains to be examined how the existence of 
several competing case managers can improve the quality and the cost effectiveness of 
medical care. In the following section, it is assumed that patients will resort to another case 
manager if they are not content with the performance of their initial case manager and, as 
well, with the medical suppliers the case manager referred the patients to. Therefore, a case 
manager has comparative advantages if he cooperates with other well-performing medical 
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suppliers. In addition, it is supposed that a patient will be dissatisfied if he is referred to other 
medical suppliers without medical reasons.  
If a case manager is compensated by capitation, he will prefer patients that rarely need 
medical care, i.e. the low risks from an insurance point of view. Hence, if a low risk requires 
health care, the case manager will provide high-quality care. He will not undersupply health 
care or simply refer to other medical suppliers because he does not want to lose low risks to 
other case managers. Yet, if high risks (i.e. those risks that cause health care costs frequently) 
consult the case manager, he can try to dissatisfy the high risks and thus to pursue indirect risk 
selection by a low quality of care. Since other case managers are not interested in high risks as 
well, they will not try to attract them through a better quality of care. Altogether, high risks do 
not receive a better medical care even if they have a possibility of choosing among different 
case managers. Thus, a quality incentive as discussed in the section before should be added to 
the case manager’s compensation. 
The tendency of a diagnosis-related fee for admission compensation reimbursed case 
manager to treat well-paid cases himself and to refer not so well-paid illnesses, is diminished 
if the case manager dissatisfies his patients with this behaviour and is in danger of loosing 
them because of his behaviour. The pressure of competition also decreases the incentive of the 
case manager to undersupply and, thus, improves the process of medical care.  
There is an incentive to provide more medical service as necessary if a medical supplier is 
reimbursed fee for service. As was discussed in the previous section, a case manager is 
induced to refrain from referrals. Yet, a pressure of competition can reduce these unwanted 
incentives if the case manager has to fear that his patients will turn out to be dissatisfied if the 
case manager refrains from referring them too often.  
In case of a fixed income the case manager is not induced to change anything in his treatment 
behaviour because of other competing case managers and avoiding patients to leave him.  
Implications for the medical care process 
The analysis of different compensation schemes has shown that the case manager is interested 
in not losing all of his patients if he is reimbursed by a capitation or by fee for admission.  
Yet, it still has to be examined how the fact that the case manager is held responsible for the 
health care of the medical suppliers, he refers his patients to influence the care process. 
If the case manager cannot influence the performance of the other medical suppliers he refers 
his patients to, the case manager might be induced to rather treat profitable patients on his 
own. Otherwise he might have to fear that the treatment of the other medical suppliers could 
9 
dissatisfy his profitable patients. He has to trade off what his patients disapprove more – 
either to be treated by the case manager even if he should refer them or to be treated by the 
efficient expert who only provides a low quality. Thus, the case manager should be able to 
influence the behaviour of the other medical suppliers if he is held responsible for their 
treatment by his patients. The case manager can influence the other medical suppliers if he 
has the responsibility of the budget and can set financial incentives for other medical suppliers 
to treat profitable patients well. But in that case there is – as discussed in the section on 
capitation – a strong incentive that non-profitable patients do not receive the required amount 
of care. Furthermore, the case manager can also influence the behaviour of other medical 
suppliers if he has the possibility to choose among them. Yet, the other medical suppliers 
must be reimbursed in a way such that they have financial penalties if only few patients 
consult them.5 However, if a case manager signals a profitable patient, the medical supplier 
who the patient is referred to will try to treat the patient to the patient’s satisfaction in order to 
ensure that the case manager will refer more patients to him. It remains questionable what 
happens if a case manager also signals non-profitable patients to other medical suppliers. The 
other medical suppliers could be induced by such a signal to dissatisfy the non-profitable 
patients and to help the case manager to pursue risk selection. Thus, a whole market for 
malpractice could develop.  
Recapitulatory, it can be pointed out that the pressure of competition among different case 
managers diminish the incentives to undersupply and to simply pass on patients but only in 
cases of profitable patients. Since non-profitable patients are not attractive for all case 
managers, competition pressure will not change anything in the way they are treated 
medically. 
3 Medical suppliers that are not involved in case managing 
3.1 Complete determination of treatments by case managers  
In this section, it is assumed that there is a case manager who completely decides on the 
treatments of all medical suppliers involved in the therapy process. The medical suppliers 
except for the case manager6 only carry out determined treatments. In that case, they cannot 
induce demand of patients nor have any influence on what kind of illnesses occurs. Thus, 
compensation schemes like capitation or admission fees transfer some risks to those suppliers 
                                                 
5 Such a negative utility does not occur when the case manager is for example reimbursed by a salary.  
6 In the remaining part of this section the medical suppliers that are not involved in the determination of 
treatments are referred to as other medical suppliers. 
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which they cannot influence. On that account, it does not seem advisable to choose these 
reimbursements. If the other suppliers are compensated by a fee for service scheme and the 
treatments are determined ex ante, they do not have any influence on their financial income. 
Yet, their earnings vary depending on what cases are referred to them. Thus, compensation 
through a salary is preferable.   
The assumption that the case managers determine all parts of a therapy and coordinates all 
treatments which other medical suppliers will be involved in, might not be realistic in all 
cases. Particularly, treatments of long-lasting diseases are often quite complex and also 
require some council by different medical specialists. In addition, the case manager does not 
have the necessary knowledge on all medical areas of expertise and thus cannot determine all 
essential treatments. Yet, medical suppliers that are involved in some disease management 
programs might be in the situation that they only have to carry out predefined treatments. 
However, it cannot be assumed that medical care services can be done within a disease 
management program because usually they are only available for some diseases. Thus, only a 
small portion of medical services might be carried out when all treatments have been 
predetermined.  
3.2 Complete coordination by the case manager 
In the following, it is assumed that the case manager assigns patients to other suppliers but 
does not specify the treatment the other medical suppliers have to carry out. This is a more 
realistic assumption for a typical case management program where for example a nurse or a 
general practitioner acts as case manager. In that case, the other medical suppliers cannot 
influence the number and kind of cases they treat but they can decide independently on what 
kind of treatment they choose. Thus, it seems to be sensible to provide an incentive for the 
other suppliers to act cost-effectively. A capitation would let the other suppliers experience 
some deviation in income on factors such as number of patient visits and kinds of illnesses 
that the other medical suppliers cannot influence. A diagnosis-related fee for admission 
compensation only puts some pressure on the other medical suppliers to treat the cases on 
hand efficiently. Thus, a DRG-compensation seems to be reasonable, but still it provides the 
incentive to undersupply medical care to the patients. A quality-based performance-related 
component of the compensation can diminish this undesirable incentive. Salary and fee for 
service compensation do not generate an incentive to undersupply but also do not include any 
inducement to provide care in an economically efficient way. In the case of a fee for service 
reimbursement, there is even an incentive to waste resources by oversupplying. This incentive 
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could be reduced by introducing some performance-based compensation with the focus on 
cost-effectiveness. Yet, the incentive for the fee for service supplier has to be stronger in order 
to reduce the oversupplying. 
3.3 Incomplete guidance of patients 
In practical implementation of medical networks, it cannot be assumed that the case manager 
can provide all diagnosis and can exclusively decide on what kind of other medical supplier 
has to be consulted next. Even if a general practitioner is the case manager, he might not be 
able to supply substantial counsel on further required treatments in all cases. Yet, other 
medical suppliers can also actually influence guidance of patients in disease management 
programs by advising the patient to quit the program. Thus, medical specialists cannot be 
excluded from diagnosing illnesses and coordinating the care process in many cases and they 
can use this diagnosis and coordination influence capability in their own interests. For 
example, medical specialists could pursue risk selection by trying to persuade the case 
manager to refer unwanted patients to another specialist. If all specialists regard a case as 
financially disadvantageous they will all try to dissuade the case manager from referring the 
patient to them. Therefore, the case manager is not counselled by other specialists from a 
medical point of view, but will be influenced because of the specialists’ financial motives. 
Thus, in practical experience of medical networks, it has to be examined how the medical 
suppliers who are not case managers can use this influence to the disprofit of the medical 
network. There is also a trade-off between cost effective financial incentives and an unbiased 
counsel of other medical suppliers. In the case of strong incentives to act cost-effectively, it 
has to be accepted that medical specialists will sometimes give advice motivated by their own 
financial interests. Alternatively, if the other medical suppliers are compensated by a salary 
they are not provided with an incentive to treat there patients particularly efficiently but at the 
same time they are not induced to give biased council to the case manager. 
4 Conclusion 
Integrated Delivery Systems and medical networks are often regarded as possibilities to 
improve quality and cost-effectiveness of medical care and, thus, as a solution for the 
problems with the German health care system. Certainly, a coordinated health care where all 
medical suppliers work together hand in hand in order to achieve a high-quality, low price 
treatment of patients is a desirable vision of a health care system. However, under the realistic 
assumption that medical suppliers have their own interests such as e.g. financial objectives, it 
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has been shown that they might be induced to depart from the optimal way of treating 
patients.  
In the focus of this paper is a medical care network where the guidance of patients is done 
centrally by a case manager. Economic implications of different reimbursement schemes for 
the case manager and for other medical suppliers were analyzed and possibilities of 
diminishing wrong incentives were discussed. As a result a trade-off between cost and quality 
incentives was identified in all discussed compensation schemes. It was shown that 
combinations of different compensation schemes could lead to a decline of false incentives. 
Yet, this automatically leads to a higher complexity of the reimbursement of the case 
managers which is not desirable as well. Particularly, in the medical care sector some 
compensation methods tend to already be very complex like e.g. DRG compensation. 
Altogether there is a trade-off between a low complexity of reimbursement and an optimally 
adapted compensation. 
In real-life medical networks, there might be more medical suppliers involved in the guidance 
of patients, especially in cases of very complex illnesses where the council of a medical 
specialist is required. This complicates the matter in particular if it assumed that these medical 
suppliers also pursue their own interests. In cases of different compensation schemes for 
different medical suppliers there might also be a tendency for collusive behaviour.  
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